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Introduction [L1] 
Transitional justice is a relatively new field of policy intervention in states moving from 
conflict to peace, or from repression to democracy. In transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy in countries like Chile and Argentina, it mainly focused on unveiling the truth 
about atrocities that had occurred in the context of primarily violations of civil and political 
rights. But it has been applied in states with very different political and economic landscapes 
and post-conflict situations, such as Liberia, Nepal, and East Timor, where demands for 
transition have extended beyond the spheres of truth seeking, accountability, reparation, 
reconciliation, and institutional reform. In these states, there have been strong calls for social 
justice transformations to address structural inequalities, poverty, and social exclusion, and 
transitional justice principles, processes, and mechanisms have, to a certain extent, been seen 
as vehicles to those ends.1  
Such calls are partly a response to a perceived failure of transitional justice, to date, to 
address many of the key causes or consequences of repression or conflict—for example, the 
failure of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to fully address racial 
discrimination and its devastating consequences.2 Similarly, important literature on 
peacebuilding has put forward the idea that a “just peace” should be sought, meaning “a 
dynamic state of affairs in which the reduction and management of violence and the 
achievement of social and economic justice are undertaken as mutual, reinforcing dimensions 
of constructive change.”3 The perceived failures of past transitional justice efforts, coupled 
with this literature, have had a significant impact on the field. 
                                                          
 I would like to thank in particular Roger Duthie, Diana Guzman, Sabine Michalowski, Tuba Turan, and Clara 
Ramirez-Barat for their helpful comments on this chapter, as well as to the experts present at the ICTJ meeting 
in The Hague in June 2015 where I shared an earlier version and received valuable feedback.  
1 Makau Mutua, “What is the Future of Transitional Justice?,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 9, no. 
1 (2015): 1–9, at 1. 
2 Mamdani Mahmood, “Reconciliation without Justice,” Southern African Review of Books 46 (1996): 3–5, 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/sarb/X0045_Mamdani.html. 
3 John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview,” in Strategies of Peace: 
Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, ed. Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (New York: Oxford 
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Some believe that transitional justice processes and mechanisms constitute tools to deal with 
these other dimensions of conflict, such as inequality, poverty, and social exclusion, 
regardless of whether they are root causes or consequences of violence. This has forced 
policy makers, practitioners, and academics to consider how, and if, transitional justice can 
contribute to such ends.  
Some of the literature supports either the enlargement of transitional justice to deal with 
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights or the widening of possible perpetrators to 
include certain types of nonstate actors like corporations.4 Others have tried to create 
synergies and linkages between transitional justice and parallel interventions, like 
development or peacebuilding,5 while still others have even suggested an alternative agenda 
for the field under the concept of “transformative justice.”6  
While the debate is growing, it does not always shed light on the transformative potential of 
transitional justice. The meaning of transformative justice remains vague and unclear, as are 
its desired goals and the ways to achieve them. Equally, the role of context—for example, in 
situations of ongoing conflict, failed states, new states, new forms of conflict, and cross-
border conflicts—as a key variable for understanding the field’s transformative potential is 
often overlooked. Further, the preconditions for bridging the gap between what is feasible in 
a transitional justice context and what is normatively desirable from a transformative justice 
point of view have not been given proper attention. 
These shortcomings need to be addressed. It is essential to understand the limits and 
possibilities of transitional justice’s role in achieving major social change such as the 
reduction of structural inequalities, discrimination, and poverty. This is important if creating 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
University Press, 2010), 19–44, at 23. See also John Paul Lederach, “Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st 
Century,” in People Building Peace (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999). 
4 Sabine Michalowski, ed., Corporate Responsibility in the Context of Transitional Justice (London: Routledge, 
2013); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Special Issue on Transitional Justice and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014; Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, “Do No Harm? Exploring the 
Scope of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 
3 (2014): 362–282. 
5 Paul Gready and John Ensor, eds., Reinventing Development? Translating Rights-based Approached from 
Theory into Practice (London/New York: Zed Books: 2005); Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds., Transitional 
Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009); Dustin N. 
Sharp, Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (New York: Springer, 2013); Gaby O. Aguilar and Felipe G. 
Isa, eds., Rethinking Transitions: Equality and Social Justice in Societies Emerging from Conflict (Belgium: 
Intersentia, 2011); Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 
2011). 
6 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 3 (2014): 339–361. 
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false expectations among victims and societies undergoing transition is to be avoided. It will 
also help to focus the work that transitional justice processes and mechanisms can and should 
do in the future.  
This chapter constitutes a contribution to this ongoing debate by changing the terms of the 
discussion. It argues that transitional justice has the potential to contribute, albeit in a modest 
way, to how societies could address some pervasive problems through structural social 
changes that are part and parcel of its remit, but it disagrees with those who see this field as a 
magic solution to the problems of structural inequality, discrimination, and poverty. To this 
end, it shows the importance of answering fundamental questions, such as: What is 
transformative justice? How can transitional justice measures have a transformative effect? 
What are the preconditions for transitional justice to be transformative? And what is the 
nature of social change in periods of transition?  
The Transformative Potential of Transitional Justice: Tracing Its Origins and Making 
Distinctions [L1] 
Transitional justice has been traditionally understood as “the set of measures implemented in 
various countries to deal with the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures 
usually include criminal prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, and different forms of 
institutional reform.”7 While this definition does not contain a promise to deliver social 
justice,8 many see in the field a unique opportunity to achieve significant social 
transformations, including poverty reduction and the elimination of discrimination.9 This 
view has gained so much momentum that the United Nations has even changed its 
institutional approach to transitional justice. An important development in this area is evident 
in the contrast between the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 report on the rule of law and 
transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies and the 2010 Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General: The United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice. While the 2004 
report recognized the problematic issue that very little was being done to address the root 
                                                          
7 Pablo de Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” in Transitional justice, NOMOS 51, ed. Melissa Williams, 
Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster (New York: NYU Press, 2012), 31–77, at 34. 
8 The meaning of social justice is contested. For the purposes of this chapter, social justice should be taken to 
mean all social changes aimed at providing people in a state with opportunities to live in a world free of 
poverty, marginalization, and discrimination and where they are able to exercise their rights and live with 
dignity. 
9 Mutua, 1; Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between 
Transitional Justice and Development,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 253–256. 
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causes of conflict,10 the 2010 Guidance Note went a step further by stating that the United 
Nations should “strive to ensure transitional justice processes and mechanisms take account 
of the root causes of conflict and repressive rule, and address violations of all rights,”11 with 
the understanding that these actions could include dealing with discrimination, exclusion, 
poverty, and violations of economic, social, and cultural rights, if applicable.12 The Guidance 
Note implies that transitional justice mechanisms and processes have the capacity to deliver 
on these issues, which are deemed to be central for significant social transformations to 
occur.13  
This shift is not without controversy, as transitional justice has had a much more limited 
remit in practice and many of its advocates consider it to be an inadequate means to deal with 
social transformation. For example, Lars Waldorf argues that “transitional justice in its 
current form is ill-suited to addressing socio-economic wrongs,” as it “struggles to deliver on 
its original promises of truth, justice and reconciliation.” 14 Its mechanisms are too weak to 
deal with these issues because budgets are already tight and those working on transitional 
justice are sometimes less knowledgeable about how to tackle social justice issues.15 
Nevertheless, the call for social justice is supported by key stakeholders, including civil 
society organizations and victims, as well as the academic literature.  
Transformative Reparation [L2] 
It is unsurprising that the first discussions of the idea of transformative justice appear in the 
context of reparation. From very early on, practitioners and academics alike have rightly 
argued that reparation is the most victim-friendly, or victim-focused, transitional justice 
measure.16 The Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
                                                          
10 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Societies, S/2004/616*, August 23, 2004, para. 4. 
11 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 
2010, principle 9, http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf. 
12 The commentary to Principle 9 of the Guidance Note clearly states that “Peace can only prevail if issues such 
as systematic discrimination, unequal distribution of wealth and social services, and endemic corruption can 
be addressed in a legitimate and fair manner by trusted public institutions.” See principle 9, at 7. 
13 Peacebuilding literature also makes constant reference to “root causes of conflict,” a concept which has 
permeated UN work on peacebuilding and the rule of law. By the time of the 1992 Agenda for Peace, 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, the UN Secretary General already believed it was 
essential to address the root causes of conflict. See A/47/277 – S/24111, June 17, 1992, paras. 15, 23 and 25. 
14 Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Social and Legal 
Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 171–186, at 179. 
15 Ibid., 171–172 and 186. 
16 Ruben Carranza, “The Right to Reparation in Situations of Poverty,” International Center for Transitional 
Justice Briefing (New York, September 2009), at 4. 
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Reparation (2007) asserts that “reparation must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-
cultural injustices, and political and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and 
girls; that reintegration and restitution by themselves are not sufficient goals of reparation, 
since the origins of violations of women’s and girls’ human rights predate the conflict 
situation.”17 This call for gender justice (or full gender equality and equal enjoyment of 
rights) means, for example, that a woman who is raped would not be adequately redressed if 
she is merely provided with access to mental and physical health services or is awarded 
compensation for the harm she suffered, if the enabling conditions themselves have not 
changed. This is because she will continue to suffer the stigma of being a rape victim, while 
the conditions that made the sexual violence possible continue, preventing her from 
recovering from the harm she suffered or potentially leading to her suffering further harms. 
Reparations should therefore aim to not only address the violation and ongoing harm suffered 
but also transform the conditions that initially made them possible, such as cultural 
stereotypes and stigma surrounding sexual violence. 
Guarantees of nonrepetition, a core aim of transitional justice, would be a useful tool to this 
end and remain crucial to realizing the transformative potential of transitional justice. Such 
measures are required in a state that is transitioning from dictatorship to democracy or from 
conflict to peace, to ensure that gross human rights violations and serious breaches of 
humanitarian law do not recur.18 As Pablo de Greiff states, this component of transitional 
justice is not like the other measures as it refers to a function that can be carried out by 
diverse preventive measures; some of these will overlap with truth seeking, criminal justice, 
and reparation but will also go beyond them.19  
For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had to decide in González et al. 
“Cotton Field” v. Mexico whether Mexico was internationally responsible for failing to 
                                                          
17 Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation (2007), para. 3, 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/NAIROBI_DECLARATIONeng.pdf. This view also influenced the work of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on sexual violence, who argued in a special report on reparations that “adequate 
reparations for women cannot simply be about returning them to where they were before the individual 
instance of violence, but instead should strive to have a transformative potential. Reparations should aspire, to 
the extent possible, to subvert, instead of reinforce, pre-existing structural inequality that may be at the root 
causes of the violence the women experience before, during and after the conflict.” United Nations, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, A/HRC/14/22, April 19, 
2010, para. 31. 
18 United Nations, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane 
Orentlicher, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, February 8, 2005, Principles 35–38. 
19 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-recurrence, A/70/438, October 21, 2015, paras. 5–9. 
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prevent the sexual abuse and murder of a woman and two girls in a case emblematic of the 
feminicidios (gender-related killings) that have ravaged Mexico and other Central American 
countries. The court found the state responsible for various violations, but, more importantly, 
for the first time in its ground-breaking jurisprudence on reparation, it stated that the redress 
should be transformative:  
Bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination in which the facts of this 
case occurred, which was acknowledged by the State . . .  the reparations must be 
designed to change this situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but 
also of rectification. In this regard, re-establishment of the same structural context 
of violence and discrimination is not acceptable.20 
The argument here was that it would be wrong simply to return the victims to the same 
situation they were in before the violation took place—restitutio ad integrum—because that 
situation was one of structural discrimination. In adopting this position, the court sought to 
strike a balance between corrective justice, which is achieved through reversing the harm 
done, and distributive justice, which not only rectifies the previous situation but also takes 
measures to address issues related to the distribution of resources, benefits, and burdens of 
victims as well as any systemic discrimination. The court also outlined some criteria to assess 
the request for reparations—for example, stating that the forms of reparation requested 
should aim to restore the victim to the status quo ante (”the way things were before”) “to the 
extent that this does not interfere with the obligation not to discriminate” or that the 
reparations “are designed to identify and eliminate the factors that cause discrimination.”21 
Despite the importance of these new criteria, the court did not apply them to the reparations it 
ordered in this case, so questions remain about the best way for the state to provide 
transformative reparations.22 
While the Cotton Field case did not deal with violations committed in the context of conflict 
or repression, the move toward transformative reparations converged with similar ideas 
developed in the context of transitional justice, particularly in the area of gender justice. 
Indeed, gender experts like Ruth Rubio-Marín have argued that reparations for women could 
                                                          
20 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cotton Field v. Mexico, November 16, 2009, preliminary objections, 
merits, reparations and costs, para. 450. 
21 Ibid., para. 451. 
22 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, “Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the inter-American 
Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgment,” Human Rights Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2011): 
1062–1091. 
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have transformative potential.23 Specifically, she contends that the design and implementation 
of reparations should avoid formal gender discrimination, find ways to ensure “that 
patriarchal norms and sexist standards and systems of values are not leaked into reparations,” 
and explore ways “to optimize the (admittedly modest) transformative potential of 
reparations programs so that they serve to advance toward the ideal of a society altogether 
free of gender subordination.”24  
The idea that reparations should be transformative has been incorporated into UN policy and 
operational guidance as requested by the UN Secretary-General in his 2014 Guidance Note 
on Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.25 Indeed, the document establishes, as a 
key guiding principle for operational engagement, that “reparations should strive to be 
transformative, including in design, implementation and impact.” However, it acknowledges 
that reparations cannot, by themselves, remove the root causes of conflict or repression, 
though they can contribute to promote, and trigger change.26 
Rodrigo Uprimny also has made a call for reparations to be transformative, emphasizing the 
importance of challenging unjust economic and power structures. When providing 
reparations in a transitional society, he argues, “we are making efforts to correct past harms 
but in an unjust society, with deep inequalities and widespread poverty.”27 Therefore, “states 
should make a deliberate effort to harmonise reparation efforts with poverty reduction 
policies and development strategies.”28 Again, Uprimny attempts to reconcile and balance 
corrective and distributive approaches to justice when awarding reparations in transitional 
societies. In his view, policy makers could achieve this through their selection of 
beneficiaries and benefits, procedural designs, and the inclusion of reparation efforts focused 
                                                          
23 There are those who disagree with the idea that gender reparation should be transformative. Margaret 
Walker, for example, claims that aiming to transform social structures through gender reparations is not only 
politically and practically difficult, it additionally “threatens to bypass or displace reparative justice as a distinct 
and distinctly victim-centered ideal in favour of a different kind of justice agenda.” See Margaret Urban 
Walker, “Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking about Gender-Just 
Reparations,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 10 (2016): 108–125, at 110. 
24 Ruth Rubio-Marín, “The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,” in The Gender of Reparations: 
Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies while Redressing Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 66. 
25 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
June 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/GuidanceNoteReparationsJune-2014.pdf  
26 Ibid., 8–9. 
27 Rodrigo Uprimny, “Transformative Reparations of Massive Gross Human Rights Violations: Between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27, no. 4 (2009): 638, 635–647. 
28 Ibid., 643. 
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on the provision of social and welfare services.29 An example would be to provide significant 
material reparations to the most vulnerable victims, while minimizing them for those who are 
less vulnerable and more affluent.30 Certainly, taking context into account, as suggested by 
Uprimny, could conflict with victims’ equal right to adequate, prompt, and effective 
reparation. Yet, for Uprimny, “a transformative concept, far from wakening the right of 
victims to reparation, makes it more meaningful, because it shows that compensation of 
victims is compatible with the pursuit of a more just society for all.”31 
It is important to note, however, that while both Rubio-Marín and Uprimny appear optimistic 
about the important transformative potential of reparations, they also recognize that the 
contribution of such an approach remains modest overall. This point is crucial because they 
do not see reparations as a panacea with the potential to solve deep-seated inequalities and 
poverty. In fact, Rubio-Marín considers that gender reparations have an important preventive 
role, as they can prevent the perpetuation of patriarchal hierarchies and ideologies and help to 
empower women. For Uprimny, reparations can “deepen democracy and improve distributive 
justice.”32 
Enlarging the Field of Transitional Justice: Transitional Justice and the Economic and 
Social Dimensions of Conflict or Repression [L2] 
The claim that reparations should be transformative is one of the current transitional justice 
conceptual challenges, but it is not the only one. Other conceptual views could be classified 
as follows, transitional justice should: 1) deal with the economic and social dimensions of 
conflict or repression; 2) deal with violations of economic, social, and cultural rights and the 
root causes of conflict or repression, not just with violations of civil and political rights; and 
3) tap into development and other policy interventions that occur in parallel with it. Given the 
interrelatedness of these issues, they are presented here under the broad heading of the 
“economic and social dimensions of conflict or repression.” These challenges may affect 
distributive-justice issues but not to the same extent and not necessarily as a result of a 
deliberate choice. For example, it is possible to advocate for the need to investigate and 
prosecute corporations, and to secure reparation from them, for their involvement in the 
commission of serious international crimes, simply because this is a natural consequence of 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 644. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 646. 
32 Ibid., 647. 
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pursuing accountability and redress for violations and not because it will achieve distributive 
justice.33 There is nothing inherently transformational in these challenges, although they may 
still prove to be the trigger for important social change in transitional societies.  
Some practitioners and academics have challenged traditional transitional justice discourse, 
arguing that a key opportunity to deal with the economic and social dimensions of conflict or 
repression is being missed when transitional justice mechanisms have not addressed 
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights as well as economic crimes, poverty, 
economic policies, development, structural discrimination, corruption,34 and/or the 
responsibility of nonstate actors like corporations. They believe that  
in many instances economic and social conditions and policies are closely linked 
to human rights abuses and might constitute a cause, means and/or consequence 
of conflict and authoritarianism [and that] ignoring potential links might then 
mean to ignore an important side of past injustices and could, at worst, lead to the 
recurrence of conflict and abusive practices.35 
They also argue that 
the failure to include economic concerns in transitional justice mechanisms tends 
to make transition into a political rather than an economic story, limiting 
knowledge of the economic underpinnings of conflict, narrowing the story of 
regime change and quelling discussion of development plans by quarantining them 
within the state and the executive rather than making them part of the transitional 
justice conversation.36 
In short, there is a wide range of views supporting the expansion of what transitional justice 
commonly addresses, but not all are based on the same assumptions. For some, transitional 
justice should be enlarged to deal with violations of economic, social, and cultural rights as 
they believe that doing so would allow justice to “contribute as it should to societies in 
transition.”37 Indeed, they assert that some degree of distributive justice is implicit in the 
respect, protection, and fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights.38 As the preamble 
                                                          
33 Clara Sandoval, Roberto Vidal, and Leo Filippini, “Linking Transitional Justice and Corporate Accountability,” 
in Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice, ed. Sabine Michalowski (London: Routledge, 
2013). 
34 Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes?,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 310–330. 
35 Lisa Hecht and Sabine Michalowski, “The Economic and Social Dimensions of Transitional Justice,” 2014, 1, 
https://www.essex.ac.uk/tjn/documents/TheeconomicandsocialdimensionsofTJ.pdf  
36 Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 266–291, at 280. See also Ismael Muvingi,” Sitting on Powder Kegs: 
Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 163-182. 
37 Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice in Transition,” International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 1–
27, at 1. 
38 Uprimny. 
10 
 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states, these rights 
“establish the minimum conditions required for people to live in a dignified way, to ensure 
freedom from fear and want, and the continuous improvement of these conditions.”39 
According to Louise Arbour, 
Transitional justice must have the ambition to assist the transformation of 
oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through 
measures that will procure an equitable future. It must reach to—but also 
beyond—the crimes and abuses committed during the conflict that led to the 
transition, and it must address the human rights violations that pre-dated the 
conflict and caused or contributed to it. With these aims so broadly defined, 
transitional justice practitioners will very likely expose a great number of 
discriminatory practices and violations of economic, social and cultural rights.40 
Addressing violations of economic, social, and cultural rights through transitional justice 
mechanisms has also been understood by some as a key way to restore capabilities of diverse 
sectors of society and promote the meaningful participation of historically marginalized 
groups.41  
While discussion continues about the extent to which these rights should be included within 
the field of transitional justice,42 their inclusion in the work of various recent truth 
commissions, such as Timor-Leste’s, Kenya’s, and Tunisia’s or the truth commission 
discussed in Colombia,43 have demonstrated the need and inclination to address them in 
certain situations.44 Even the United Nations has moved toward operationalizing this 
inclusion.45  
Others have advocated for linking transitional justice and development through issues such as 
poverty reduction, land redistribution, universal education, health care, good governance, and 
human rights,46 with the potential to at least, to some degree, “improve the socioeconomic 
                                                          
39 Preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly Res. 
2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966.  
40 Arbour, 3. 
41 Thomas Bundschuh, “Enabling Transitional Justice, Restoring Capabilities: The Imperative of Participation 
and Normative Integrity,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 9 (2015): 10–32. 
42 OHCHR, Special Issue on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
43 CAVR, Chega: The Report of the Commission for the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, Part 
II; Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 2013, Vol. IIB. 
44 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-recurrence, A/HRC/21/46, August 9, 2012, para. 17. 
45 OHCHR, Special Issue, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
46 Roger Duthie, “Toward a Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 292–309. 
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conditions of people.”47 However, different views exist about the type of relationship that 
should be fostered between the two fields.48 Some have suggested one possible angle would 
be via the concept of human development, given that a failure to address past atrocities would 
hinder the development and exercise of victims’ capabilities and thereby prevent them from 
being and doing what they choose.49 But most of the literature addressing this connection 
looks at particular transitional justice measures and the way they can coexist harmoniously 
with development, or the way that development tools, such as aid or conditionalities 
(pursuing certain policies or achieving certain results), should be managed.50  
Those looking at reparations, for example, contend that efforts to redress serious harm should 
be done from a development angle, as Uprimny has proposed.51 Instead of providing 
monetary compensation, for instance, which might be used to pay victims’ debts or be 
distributed among family members, some argue that compensation could take the form of 
shares in microfinance institutions because this practice might empower victims in the 
future.52 Others argue that development packages and aid could include the financing of 
reparation programs.53 By understanding guarantees of nonrepetition as a reparation measure 
with both forward- and backward-looking dimensions, they could be used to prevent 
corruption and other financial crimes and setbacks that both hamper development and spark 
conflict or repression.54  
But enlarging the field of transitional justice—that is, extending its scope to include 
development issues (such as poverty and marginalization), corruption, or violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights—is not the same as claiming that transitional justice is 
or could be synonymous with transformative justice. Indeed, as has been argued, these 
matters may be addressed by transitional justice mechanisms because they are either a root 
cause or consequence of conflict or repression, and/or because not dealing with them would 
prevent transitional justice from achieving its goals. Certainly, if a serious attempt is made to 
tackle a conflict’s root causes or consequences it will inherently constitute a transformational 
                                                          
47 Roger Duthie, “Introduction,” in Transitional Justice and Development, 17. 
48 Duthie, “Toward a Development-sensitive Approach,” 309. 
49 Pablo de Greiff, “Articulating the Links Between Transitional Justice and Development: Justice and Social 
Integration,” in Transitional Justice and Development, 48–55. 
50 Marcus Lenzen, “Roads Less Travelled? Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling Blocks) for Development and 
Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice and Development, 77–99. 
51 See the section on transformative reparation in this chapter. 
52 de Greiff, “Articulating the Links,” 37. 
53 Mani, 256. 
54 de Greiff, 38. 
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effort; however, that is not the same as saying that transitional justice is, by itself, 
transformational of social conditions. Therefore, it is vital to understand that while 
commonalities exist between the transformative justice discourse in the field of transitional 
justice and the views of those appealing for the enlargement of the field, they do not 
necessarily have a common transformative agenda. To understand more about the differences 
between these two strands, it is important to examine the literature on transformative justice.  
“Transformative Justice”: Beyond Enlarging the Field of Transitional Justice [L1] 
The term transformative justice frequently appears in the writings of practitioners and 
scholars working on transitional justice issues and related fields. Indeed, and just by way of 
illustration, a search for these words in the leading journal on the subject, The International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, highlights the importance of the concept in current literature. 
Of the more than 300 articles published by the journal between 2007 and the first issue of 
2016,55 the term transformative justice or alternative terms such as transformative change, 
transformative transitional justice, or transformative as an adjective appear in almost every 
single article. This reflects the perception among both practitioners and academics that the 
transformative dimension of transitional justice is a key area of inquiry, even if disagreements 
remain over the extent to which transitional justice could be transformational, how much 
transformation could be achieved, and how to operationalize it. 
Two such articles are of particular note. The first, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding 
After Mass Violence,” written by Wendy Lambourne in 2009, shows the impact of 
peacebuilding literature on transitional justice. It aims to “develop a model of transformative 
justice that supports sustainable peacebuilding.”56 While Lambourne explicitly identifies 
some conditions for transformation—such as civil society participation; transdisciplinary, 
long-term, and sustainable processes; the inclusion of different cultural approaches to justice; 
and the transformation of social, economic, and political structures57—she does not flesh out 
the concept or provide an agenda for change. Indeed, her article is an attempt to diagnose the 
problems of the field in order to claim that “what is needed is a revolution in thinking that 
challenges the dominance of western legal discourse and creatively and inclusively develops 
                                                          
55 The count includes all components of any single published journal: the editorial notes, the articles, notes 
from the field, and book reviews. 
56 Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 284–8, at 28. Emphasis added. 
57 Ibid., 30. 
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new ways of conceiving of accountability mechanisms that provide a more comprehensive 
and holistic experience of justice.”58 
The second article, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice,” written by Paul Gready and Simon Robins in 2014, was one of the journal’s most-
read articles as of July 2016. The authors build on Lambourne’s analysis but go further in 
their attempt to outline a concept of transformative justice that involves “transformative 
change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than 
preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships 
and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level.”59 They also support 
enlarging the field of transitional justice to address issues such as development and violations 
of economic, social, and cultural rights. However, they believe that existing attempts in this 
direction have “fall[en] short of a transformative approach”60 because they have prioritized 
civil and political rights; dismissed the value of positive peace61; taking a top-down, a state-
centered approach controlled by an elite of professionals and donors, which undermines local 
participation and empowerment; and failed to address the ongoing and changing violence that 
persists well after a transition has “ended.”62 They argue for a different approach,  developed 
in close cooperation with peacebuilding and conflict-transformation efforts,63 that would 
emphasize the process through which victims are empowered, rather than just outcomes.  
Articles calling for transformative justice share some underlying assumptions.64 First, 
transitional justice should and could deal with structural inequality and discrimination, 
including gender power relations. This implies enlarging the field to deal with, among other 
issues, development questions and violations of economic, social, and cultural rights but also 
to work in tandem with other peacebuilding and conflict-transformation activities. 
Accordingly, dealing with these areas is not only about enlarging the field but also about 
transforming social conditions. Second, a different type of response is needed, one that 
prioritizes process, context, participation, and needs over outcomes and that adopts a bottom-
                                                          
58 Ibid., 47. 
59 Gready and Robins, 340. 
60 Ibid., 340 and 360. 
61 Ibid., 341. 
62 Ibid., 348. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Other articles on transformative justice that look at particular dimensions include Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans, 
and Nesam McMillan, “Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual 
Approach,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 2 (2014): 194; and Dustin N. Sharp, 
“Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic Transition,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 9, no. 1 (2015): 150–169. 
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up approach to addressing violations and providing redress, one that is not state-centered and 
that is driven by victims and for victims.65 Third, transitional justice is not just a legally 
driven field; a transformative approach would also involve drawing on other disciplines 
beyond law, such as politics or economics.  
Collectively, these common assumptions denote a change in approach to transitional justice 
that goes beyond merely enlarging the scope of the field; they emphasize the form and the 
process through which the field is enlarged. In a way, they put forward a victim-centered 
approach to transitions. While the literature on transformative justice has yet to provide 
concrete tools to fulfill these ambitions, it nevertheless constitutes a radical attempt to change 
the field of transitional justice.  
Preliminary Considerations Regarding the Search for Transitional Justice’s 
Transformative Potential [L1] 
Missing from the transformative justice literature is a detailed examination of the capacity 
and potential for the field to be truly transformative. Such an inquiry would require 
consideration of the meaning of transitional justice and its goals, the context in which 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms are used (the types of conflict and/or repression 
to which it responds, along with other variables, like state fragility or failure), the meaning of 
social change, and the nature of the field of transitional justice itself.66 These essential 
building blocks frame the limits and opportunities for any type of transformation. What 
follows are some reflections on the capacity of transitional justice to be transformative. 
The Transitional Justice Context [L2] 
Transitional justice processes take place in a context where, as a general rule, a political 
rupture in the continuum of violent conflict or repression has occurred. The rupture results 
from a new configuration of political forces that is able to challenge the dominant system.67 
For instance, in Argentina, the 1982 embarrassing defeat in the Falklands War and economic 
stagnation that followed helped to bring about the fall of the military junta in 1983 and the 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 358. 
66 Other considerations are also important such as the relationship between serious human rights violations 
and breaches of humanitarian law, and the root causes and consequences of conflict or repression.  
67 Michelle Parlevliet, “Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective,” Research Center 
for Constructive Conflict Management, 13, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdfp 
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end of the so-called Dirty War, which then led to the restoration of democracy.68 In Liberia, 
international pressure against the rule of President Charles Taylor  during the Second 
Liberian Civil War (which began in 1999) brought the country to a political breaking point, 
leading Taylor to step down and paving the way for a peace agreement to be signed in 2003 
and a transitional government, to be installed until new elections were held in 2005.69 
Such ruptures represent a break from the old system and from the ideology (political, legal, 
social, cultural, and so on) that allowed atrocities to occur. These breaks have multiple 
causes, often related to the loss of political power and legitimacy of one of the sides and/or 
the need to address the root causes of the conflict or political repression. They give rise to 
unique opportunities for the reconfiguration of politics and power that allow transitional 
justice mechanisms and processes to be deployed. Nevertheless, the social, political, 
economic, and cultural contexts behind the atrocities, including their root causes and 
perpetrators, tend to vary greatly between countries, particularly between countries 
transitioning from a repressive regime and those transitioning from conflict. One constant, 
however, is the gross nature of the violations that have taken place, even if the scale of the 
atrocities and damage differs from one place to another.  
In Liberia, for example,  
the country’s infrastructure was destroyed: there were no electrical grids, public 
running water, sewage, or other utilities . . . Bullet holes adorned the buildings, 
lampposts, and street signs. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
Liberians fled to Monrovia, a city that could accommodate far fewer, resulting in 
massive slums of tin shacks, garbage, human waste and disease.70  
There was “devastation of both the people and state institutions, denoting the collapse of both 
state and society.”71  
The nature of the violence in Argentina was very different. There, the government and right-
wing death squads carried out violence against very specific groups of people targeted 
                                                          
68 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 147. 
69 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, S/2003/875, 
September 11, 2003, paras. 3–19. 
70 John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, “Wider Lessons from Peacebuilding: Security Sector 
Reform in Liberia,” Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, June 2010, 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/LiberiaPAB610.pdf. 
71 Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia,” Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forced (DCAF), Occasional Paper no. 9, December 2005, 6, 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-Challenges-and-Opportunities-of-Security-Sector-Reform-in-Post-
Conflict-Liberia. 
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because they were seen as political or economic threats: left-wing activists and militants, 
political dissidents, and those suspected of supporting socialism, including trade unionists, 
students, and journalists.   
Those responsible for violations were mainly state servants, members of the police or the 
military, under the command of four different military juntas that were in power from 1976 to 
1983, or the Montoneros, a leftist rebel group. As in Liberia, other states also played a role in 
authoritarian regimes, as illustrated by Operation Condor, a campaign of political repression 
and state terror involving intelligence operations and assassination of opponents, carried out 
in the Southern Cone of South America.72  
Yet, the economy was not in relatively good shape; poverty was far less widespread than in 
Liberia. State institutions used by the junta to carry out atrocities needed to be purged, not 
built from scratch. The challenge at the time mainly related to how to turn repressive 
institutions into rights-respecting ones and to improve the economy.73In Liberia, perpetrators 
of atrocities included government officials, members of various militias and rebel groups, 
such as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the Independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia and the Revolutionary United Front, as well as powerful political figures like 
Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor. All of these individuals and groups had control over 
different parts of the country and, in some cases, even enjoyed the support of neighboring 
states. The root causes of conflict in Liberia included competition for resources, tribal and 
ethnic tensions, poverty, and inequality. In terms of the types of violations and their scale, it 
is calculated that in Liberia between 1989 and 2003 over 250,000 persons were killed, over 
one million were internally displaced, and hundreds of thousands were made refugees.74 
These numbers are particularly high if we consider that, in 2000, Liberia had approximately 
2.9 million inhabitants.75 This means that approximately 50 percent of the population were 
victims of the conflict.  
                                                          
72 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: The New 
Press, 2003), 323. 
73 Javier Lewkowicz, “La Herencia Económica que Dejo Videla,” Página 12, May 18, 2013, 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-220300-2013-05-18.html. 
74 Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Preliminary Findings and Determinations, December 19, 2008, 
Vol. I, at 44. 
75 See http://www.worldmeters.info/world-population/Liberia-population/. 
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In Argentina, on the other hand, an estimated 10,000-30,000 individuals went missing and 
were likely forcibly disappeared during the Dirty War.76 Many others were tortured, detained, 
and denied civil and political rights, with certain political parties being banned—and their 
family members and friends intimidated. At the height of the repression 26 million 
inhabitants lived in the country, meaning the percentage of victims in Argentina was 
significantly lower than in Liberia. This is in line with the state’s targeted use of violence. 
Different contexts, root causes, perpetrators, and scales of violence mean not only different 
challenges for transitional justice mechanisms but also different opportunities for social 
change. While social change was and is possible in both Argentina and Liberia, it is 
important to clarify the nature of the type of potential social change in each country. The 
deployment of transitional justice mechanisms constitutes a unique, if small, window of 
opportunity to contribute to the transformation of dominant ideologies and structures that 
permitted or consented to atrocities. Nevertheless, the transformative potential of transitional 
justice depends highly on the capacity of its mechanisms to respond to and deal with 
challenging conditions that predate their work. 
The Meaning and Forms of Social Change: Ordinary, Structural, and Fundamental [L2] 
The idea that transitional justice can be transformative relies on the assumption that social 
change is possible. In other words, one must believe that it is possible to remove the social, 
political, economic, and cultural conditions that allowed for the repression or conflict to take 
place—and to move toward the realization of certain desired social goals, such as human 
rights protection, democracy, and rule of law.  
However, the potential for social change is often taken for granted, while the capacity of the 
social system to remain unchanged is usually overlooked.77 The degree of “fixity” of those 
elements of the social system that prevent transformations from taking place should be 
                                                          
76 Human rights groups in Argentina estimate approximately 30,000 persons were disappeared during the 
repression. El Clarín, “Una duda histórica: no se sabe cuántos son los desaparecidos,” October 6, 2003, 
http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2003/10/06/p-00801.htm. According to the findings of CONADEP, the National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, 8,960 people went missing. Nunca Mas, Part IV, 
Recommendations and Conclusions, September 1984. The real number of disappeared and executed people is 
considered to be higher.  
77 Robert Nisbet develops a powerful argument to show the priority of fixity over change in the social sphere. 
He claims that “change is, however, not ‘natural’, not normal, much less ubiquitous and constant. Fixity is.” He 
then continues: “In the realm of observation and common sense, nothing is more obvious than the 
conservative bent of human behaviour, the manifest desire to preserve, hold, fix and keep stable. Common 
sense tells us that, given the immense sway of habit in individual behaviour and of custom, tradition, and the 
sacred in collective behaviour, change could hardly be a constant, could hardly be ubiquitous.” Robert Nisbet, 
Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 271. 
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carefully scrutinized to understand whether these preexisting conditions can be changed in a 
transformative manner.78 One key aspect in this regard is the existence of a dominant 
ideology, that is, a set of beliefs about what is right and wrong that permeates everyday life 
and that exists and is reproduced, reinforced, and perpetuated using law, education, politics, 
media, culture, and religion. Dominant ideologies can facilitate or permit atrocities—when, 
for example, they are supported by those with political and economic power to persuade 
others of what is right and wrong. 
We may distinguish between three different types of social change: ordinary change, 
structural change, and fundamental change. These types of change can apply in any type of 
social context, but the key to distinguishing between them is the impact each has on dominant 
ideologies and social structures. In the case of transitional justice, it is important to 
understand whether, when, and why these changes are possible.  
When political, social, economic, and/or cultural changes result in a transformation of both 
the ideologies and the structures that supported the conflict or the repressive regime, then 
they will constitute fundamental social change. If they do not, they constitute ordinary social 
change or structural social change alone. Structural change on its own does not amount to 
fundamental change even if it can contribute to ideological change. 
Ordinary social change refers to everyday changes that align with dominant ideologies and 
structures in society. For example, during the so-called Global War on Terror, security 
concerns in many countries have been prioritized over human rights considerations. It may 
even be said that people in general believe that strong security measures are needed to fight 
terrorism. This belief is not new but simply builds on existing ideologies and structures 
reproduced through law, education, media, and other means.  
Equally, the enactment of an amnesty law or a statute of limitation in a given country could 
constitute, depending on the context, a form of ordinary change common during transitional 
periods, even if it also represents a legal change. While these laws, as well as antiterrorist 
views, could be seen as extraordinary measures because they are adopted under exceptional 
circumstances, they are generally put in place or enacted to maintain the ideologies that 
facilitated atrocities or to arrive at a compromise with them. Though they may emerge as a 
                                                          
78 Consider, for example, how difficult it is to enact a new political constitution, especially when inside rigid 
legal systems, or to enact a new treaty in the international arena. Most of the changes in the law are gradual 
changes that have to follow certain patterns in order not to violate the essence of the system in which they 
take place. 
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result of a significant political struggle and face significant resistance, ultimately they do not 
necessarily threaten or transform the dominant ideology or structures. They either perpetuate 
them or, at most, weaken them without transforming their foundations. 
Structural change is a bit more complex; it can sometimes give the illusion that fundamental 
social change is at stake. A good example is the adoption of a new constitution. Such a 
change is often considered to be fundamental, given that the very foundations of the legal 
system have been overhauled. However, this type of change is, in fact, structural because, 
while it may be necessary, it is insufficient to transform the dominant ideologies and 
structures. The adoption of a new constitution, while an important guarantee of nonrepetition, 
will not constitute, in and of itself, a fundamental change.  
The case of South Africa illustrates this point. The 1991 National Peace Accord provided for 
the creation of a multiparty democracy and the promotion of social reconstruction and 
development.79 Subsequently, the post-apartheid interim constitution of 1993 and the 
constitution of 1996 established civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, along 
with various remedies for individuals and important social institutions to transform the status 
quo established by the apartheid regime. Even so, despite the existence of these legal 
documents and the work carried out by institutions like the South African Constitutional 
Court to protect rights, deep inequalities that became entrenched in South African society 
under apartheid remain present. Therefore, important aspects of the apartheid ideology persist 
in South African society today, even if structural transformation has taken place.80 It is 
undeniable that the right to racial equality has gained currency in South Africa, but more 
work needs to be done to ensure that people truly believe in and cherish this right. Equally, 
ideological change is insufficient if it does not penetrate and transform all the preexisting 
conditions that facilitated apartheid, such as access to land or basic living conditions. 
The establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, 
commissions of inquiry, civil and criminal tribunals, and reparations programs, during 
moments of crisis or change would, in principle, constitute structural changes if they help to 
transform the ideologies that made the atrocities possible. They do so, in particular, by 
providing truth to counter harmful, destructive narratives, justice and reparation to restore the 
rights and dignity of victims, and institutional reform that removes repressive policies and 
practices.  
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80 Bundschuh, 11–12. 
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Nevertheless, there is nothing intrinsic to any of these mechanisms that makes them structural 
changes per se. Indeed, they could be created merely to give the impression that the dominant 
ideology is changing, when in reality, the objective is to maintain the status quo. Where this 
is the case, such measures are elements of ordinary change because they are built on the 
foundations of the previous regime, and their tasks will be driven by dominant ideologies that 
permitted atrocities. Therefore, it is not the presence of transitional justice mechanisms 
themselves that determines the nature of the change but rather other factors, such as the 
powers the mechanisms are given (human, financial, legal) to achieve their aims, the 
seriousness with which the state takes their decisions/recommendations, and the impact they 
have on dominant ideologies.  
Fundamental social change occurs when various structural changes provide foundations for 
new dominant ideologies inspired by radically different values to those evident during the 
repression or conflict to flourish. Furthermore, these values must be respected, endorsed, 
adopted, and articulated by different political sectors and ideologies of society and be given 
life through different norms, institutions, education, and culture, so that they are ultimately 
able to affect the economic, social, political, and other conditions that permitted the conflict 
or repression. In the words of Erin Daly, “part of the process of transformation, therefore, 
entails inculcating new values in the society.”81  
While transitional justice mechanisms can contribute to the transformation of dominant 
ideologies, they do not lead to such changes on their own but rather only in combination with 
other structural changes. In cases like Liberia where competition for resources, poverty, and 
tribal and ethnic conflicts were at the heart of the conflict, transitional justice mechanisms 
cannot alone transform such social conditions. They can certainly contribute to change but 
not in isolation; it is recognized that such measures work better when instituted 
comprehensively. Structural changes to overcome poverty in post-conflict situations include 
the design of a poverty-reduction strategy that takes due account of the conflict and local 
context but also include a good aid policy and, among other things, the involvement of 
entities other than transitional justice mechanisms and stakeholders like development 
actors.82   
                                                          
81 Erin Daly, “Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation,” International Legal Perspectives 12, no. 
73 (2001): 81. 
82 For more on the needed reforms in such contexts, see Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 
Countries are Failing and What can be Done about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 175–192. 
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Furthermore, ideological transformation is intergenerational. It does not happen within a 
short period of time and would be highly unlikely to occur within the brief lifespan of most 
transitional justice mechanisms, which by their very nature are meant to be transitory,83 
though they should leave a lasting legacy (including by making recommendations for needed 
fundamental and structural changes). Cases like Chile and Argentina illustrate this point. It is 
only now—more than two decades after the transitions began in those states—that structural 
changes, including those implemented through multiple transitional justice mechanisms, such 
as criminal accountability for past crimes of major perpetrators have gained force. 
Transitional justice happens, as already indicated, during a rupture where a particular 
configuration of political forces gives rise to opportunity for change, though within 
constraints. Therefore, the majority of changes taking place in processes of transitional justice 
are ordinary or structural. This does not mean that change in states undergoing transitions is 
not important. Indeed, transitional justice principles and mechanisms can be meaningfully 
deployed only in states where dominant ideologies have been weakened, are under threat, and 
have lost legitimacy (as happened with the apartheid regime in South Africa or with the 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone). This situation constitutes a unique, if small, window of 
opportunity to contribute to social transformation. If transitional justice mechanisms and 
processes are deployed under the right conditions, then they offer important opportunities for 
triggering or contributing to fundamental change. 
The Nature of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Processes [L2] 
It is equally important to understand the nature of transitional justice processes and 
mechanisms, as this frames the possibilities for ordinary, structural, and fundamental social 
change within and outside the field. The following variables influence the work of these 
mechanisms and the way they bring about social change. 
                                                          
83 Transitional justice mechanisms have been defined as transitory in nature, meaning that they are created to 
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First, transitional justice mechanisms have preestablished aims that are regulated by a 
normative framework that sets limits and offers opportunities. Four branches of public 
international law drive the mechanisms: international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, refugee law, and international criminal law.84 Driven by this framework 
they aim to achieve as much truth seeking, criminal justice, reparation, reform, and 
prevention as possible, but to do so, important policy choices must be made. As a result of 
these decisions, the investigation of some crimes is prioritized above others, the parameters 
for classifying who does and does not count as a victim are set, the areas of truth to be 
elucidated are established, and forms of institutional reform and guarantees of nonrepetition 
are negotiated. While bound by this normative framework, the mechanisms are also 
extraordinary. They deal with serious atrocities that happened in a systematic manner, 
causing irreparable harm to victims and society. They do not deal with everyday crimes but 
with complex situations. They are also extraordinary in the sense that they deal with such 
atrocities in a distinctive way that takes due account of context and the magnitude of the 
challenges faced. 
Second, because these mechanisms (like the societies in which they are implemented) are 
relatively weak and fragile, their work faces constraints. They often lack important political 
leverage to carry out their mandates and are contingent on the specific circumstances of their 
post-repression or post-conflict context. Institutional settings, political support, and 
availability of human and economic resources all affect the role that transitional justice 
mechanisms can play during the transition.85 For example, the final report of Kenya’s Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission was altered by several of the commissioners before it 
was officially handed to the government because  it contained allegations of wrongdoing by 
President Uhuru Kenyatta and members of his family.86 Likewise, because of a lack of 
political will or financial resources, reparations—and many of the other recommendations 
made by truth commissions—remain a promise rather than a reality for the majority of 
victims, including in states like South Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and East Timor. A 
                                                          
84 UN Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 3.  
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2014.pdf. 
23 
 
consequence of being weak and fragile, and contingent on outside variables, is that these 
mechanisms work in an imperfect manner.87. 
Third, as already mentioned, these mechanisms are also transitional. They are established to 
operate for a particular period of time. Therefore, institutional continuity, sustainability, and 
capacity building are all challenges because the mechanisms are set up to deal with a 
particular situation for only a brief period of time and then cease to exist.  
In most cases, however, expectations for transitional justice do not account for these features 
and inherent limitations and therefore fail to provide ways to overcome them. Transitional 
justice mechanisms have not been designed to achieve social justice, development, 
democracy, rule of law, or peace in themselves, but they can contribute toward the realization 
of some of these goals. It is best to be realistic about the field of transitional justice. In such 
terms, transitional justice is about reckoning with a legacy of mass atrocities and achieving as 
much justice, truth, reparation, and prevention as possible given existing constraints. These 
can be meaningful structural changes that are meant to contribute to a fundamental 
transformation of the ideologies that allowed such atrocities to occur. These are goals that 
transitional justice can work toward, using the various forms of change already indicated. 
This is not to set the bar too low. Indeed, transitional justice has struggled for decades to 
deliver even on these terms. There are also compelling moral reasons for remaining realistic, 
such as to avoid raising the hopes of victims, which could potentially lead to their 
revictimization, and to ensure that scarce resources are used in the best possible way. 
From the above analysis, it follows that fundamental social change cannot be achieved 
exclusively during a transitional moment. During such moments, ordinary and structural 
social changes could, and often do, take place. Multiple structural changes can combine to 
bring about fundamental social changes, but these must occur both within and outside of 
transitional justice measures, affecting key areas where repressive ideologies and structures 
used to dominate. As a result, these changes can take a great deal of time to happen. While 
transitional justice cannot deliver fundamental change on its own, it can contribute to it by 
way of structural social changes. Indeed, as de Greiff has said, we cannot neglect the 
“significance of transitional moments for the articulation and establishment of norms, values, 
and institutions, including those that both sustain and are sustained by legal systems of 
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justice.”88 Such changes could have a lasting impact on the future of states ravaged by 
repression or conflict. 
Maximizing the Transformative Potential of Transitional Justice [L1] 
An important question remains about how to reconcile a realistic approach to transitional 
justice with a more normative approach to transformative justice. In other words, how can we 
maximize the transformative potential of transitional justice? How do we get transitional 
justice to deliver on its stated goals, those of dealing with a legacy of mass atrocities while 
paving the way for a rule-of-law system where human rights protection is possible, while also 
contributing to broader social change? This section identifies essential conditions to this end. 
Context is an important and constant variable. The transformative potential of transitional 
justice will be, as already indicated, partly determined by the context in which it happens—
post-conflict or post-repression, for example—and there will be striking differences even 
within and across conflict situations, for example, that will determine the possibilities for 
social change. 
There is broad consensus that transitional justice is meant to deal with the legacy of mass 
atrocities through four pillars: truth seeking, criminal justice, reparation, and institutional 
reform.89 Seen from this perspective, transitional justice is not only about dealing with 
violations that occurred and their consequences; it also has a significant preventive dimension 
that requires addressing the root causes of conflict or repression and the empowerment of 
victims as much as possible. Bearing this in mind, the following conditions would be 
necessary to maximize the transitional justice’s transformative potential. 
First, it should be recalled that ideally transitional justice will not be seen as a menu of 
processes from which states can pick and choose.90 Transitional justice mechanisms should 
be seen as complementary and interdependent,91 which means that their success in achieving 
their aims and maximizing the transformative potential of the field depends strongly on their 
capacity to coexist and reinforce each other. If they are seen and used as a package, structural 
changes are more likely to take place. As de Greiff puts it, there is “convincing empirical 
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evidence that they work best, as justice measures, when designed and implemented in a 
comprehensive fashion rather than in isolation from one another.”92  
In practice, however, states have been very selective about the processes they are ready to 
engage in, and those they do implement face various limitations (political, financial, legal, 
and human). For example, truth seeking is sometimes prioritized by those in power as a 
means to obviate the need for criminal trials, as was the case in El Salvador. Reparation is 
often nothing more than an undelivered promise. Indeed, few examples exist of states that 
have taken seriously the obligation to redress victims. Guarantees of nonrepetition are also 
lacking in almost every state pursuing transitional justice. Persuading states to consider the 
aggregate value of all transitional justice processes and mechanisms is not just a political 
challenge. Various questions remain about how to link the mechanisms in a way that 
enhances their potential to achieve their corrective and distributive aims and about whether 
sequencing is necessary. 
However, as the field of transitional justice evolves and new experiences emerge, we 
continue to learn about the added value of using all of these measures together. Colombia is a 
good example of a country attempting to do this. Indeed, during the peace negotiations in 
Havana, the state, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC) 
and other actors supported justice, truth, reparation, and guarantees of nonrepetition through a 
package called the Victims’ Agreement. While, arguably, more work could be done on the 
prevention side, Colombia is not picking and choosing among mechanisms. Moreover, it has 
accepted that transitional justice is not only backward- but also forward-looking. The peace 
deal endorsed by Congress in November 2016 looks at the root causes of conflict and 
includes a distributive dimension. Indeed, in Colombia, the Victims Agreement would set up 
an Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition,93 complemented by 
other measures that have been agreed on at the negotiating table. For example, in the 
agreement on the Integrated Agrarian Development Policy, the government and the FARC 
“establish the foundations for the structural transformation of rural land” through the Rural 
Comprehensive Reform (Reforma Rural Integral) and create better living conditions for those 
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living in those areas.94 They equally acknowledge that land was a root cause of conflict or, at 
the very least, was a condition that facilitated the persistence of violence.95 Therefore, a key 
aspect of the Colombian negotiations has been rural reform with a territorial approach. At the 
same time, the FARC and the government have agreed on the establishment of a truth 
commission with a broad mandate that includes looking into root causes of conflict; 
determining the impact of the conflict on economic, social, and cultural rights and the 
environment; and clarifying the responsibility of different actors, not only armed actors.96 
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the justice element of the peace negotiations, is also 
envisaged to have jurisdiction over more than just armed actors,97 and the new agreement 
contains important provisions on reparations for victims, including from the FARC.98 
A holistic strategy linking the various transitional justice measures, including guarantees of 
nonrepetition, requires action at various social levels. The lack of one of the measures could 
be an indication that the state is adopting ordinary social change, in the form of individual 
mechanisms, as opposed to structural change. Indeed, the will of states to reckon with the 
past can be measured by their acceptance of criminal justice, truth seeking, reparation, and 
guarantees of nonrepetition as necessary parts of a successful transition. The less states are 
willing to work toward those aims together and implement structural change, the more 
questions will be raised about their will to deal with the legacy of mass atrocities and the 
more elusive fundamental social change will be.  
Second, transitional justice processes cannot be designed in isolation from other interventions 
Planners should instead find ways to complement and enhance such measures, including 
development projects; the protection and fulfillment of economic, social, cultural, and 
environmental rights; the work of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and 
other peacebuilding programs; and humanitarian aid initiatives. They must always aim to 
maximize their lasting and distributive impact,99 particularly in post-conflict states. As stated 
by Lambourne, if “sustainable peace building requires pursuit of the twin objectives of 
preserving ‘negative peace (absence of physical violence) and building ‘positive peace’ 
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(presence of social justice), as well as alleviation, if not elimination, of the underlying causes 
of conflict,”100 then transitional justice can contribute to such objectives. For example, in a 
post-conflict situation, a truth-seeking mechanism can shed light on the root causes of 
conflict so that they can then be targeted by other measures to prevent the recurrence of war. 
The recommendations of a truth commission in this area could be particularly useful, as could 
its proactive work of communicating their findings to relevant actors.  
Third, dealing with the legacy of mass atrocities is a long-term undertaking. The task of 
entirely expunging the ideology and structures that allowed and consented to such atrocities 
takes more than just a few months or years. This is particularly true in post-conflict or failed-
state situations, where almost everything, including institution building, may require starting 
from scratch. It takes time to build new institutions and establish legal frameworks, but it 
takes even longer to change ways of thinking about humanity, right and wrong, and the goals 
that society should pursue. Unfortunately, transitional justice continues to be thought of in the 
short term. States emerging from repression or conflict usually support such processes for 
only a brief period of time. Sustained investment (human and financial) in reckoning with the 
past, however, is essential to maximize the transformative potential of transitional justice. It 
is not only that structural and fundamental social changes take time to materialize but also 
that states engaging with transitional justice have to constantly adjust their policy 
interventions in this area.  
Chile’s experience with this process presents a good example of the decades it can take to 
move forward and transform ideologies. Though more than a quarter of a century has now 
passed since Augusto Pinochet left power and Patricio Aylwin became president of the 
country, the country’s constitution is still the one instituted under Pinochet in 1980 (although 
it has been amended on various occasions), and the amnesty law of 1978 (Decree 2191/1978) 
that prevents those suspected of committing human rights violations between 11 September 
1973 and 10 March 1978 from being tried in court, remains part of the legal system. Even 
today, crimes committed by Pinochet and his followers are still being investigated. This is not 
to suggest that ordinary and structural changes have not taken place. Without a doubt, Chile 
has made significant advances in a transitional justice process that has included providing 
reparations, memorialization, truth seeking, and criminal justice measures. However, it did 
not deliver on these rights immediately after the state returned to democratic rule. Indeed, 
while its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to clarify the truth about enforced 
                                                          
100 Lambourne, 34. 
28 
 
disappearances and killings and related violations such as torture,101 was established in 1990, 
it was not until September 2003, 13 years later, that the National Commission on Political 
Imprisonment and Torture (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisón Politica y Tortura, “Valech 
Commission”) was created to identify the victims of detention and torture for political 
reasons.102 In Chile, transitioning from a repressive to a democratic regime remains an 
ongoing project. Nevertheless, support for its transitional justice efforts, from both within the 
state and the international community, has slowly dissipated.  
Fourth, transitional justice processes should always focus on empowering victims and those 
most vulnerable as a consequence of the conflict or repression, aiming to transform their lives 
as much as possible. Empowerment in this context must be understood as “the process of 
enhancing an individual’s or group’s capacity to make purposive choices and to transform 
those choices into desired actions and outcomes.”103 Emphasis on empowering victims is 
important because only if they feel and understand that they matter to society, and that they 
are agents of social change, will they help to transform repressive ideologies and social 
structures that permitted and promoted violations. Otherwise, victims will remain 
marginalized and victimized.104  
Empowerment requires removing the barriers that hinder victims’ active participation in 
society, on the one hand, and the active promotion of their social inclusion and participation 
in transitional justice measures, in particular, and society in general, on the other. For 
example, structural discrimination is a key barrier that needs to be removed and transitional 
justice mechanisms could contribute toward this, even if they cannot overcome it on their 
own. They can help to explain how discrimination has permitted or promoted violence, 
through the work of a truth commission, for example, while a reparations program can take 
such barriers into account and provide communities who have suffered discrimination with 
some forms of financial empowerment thorough micro-credits or investment projects. 
Transitional justice mechanisms can also design or recommend affirmative action measures. 
Equally, institutional reform could transform the laws and policies that facilitated structural 
discrimination. An additional obstacle to overcome relates to the effects of mass atrocities on 
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victims’ mental and physical well-being. If victims do not have access to adequate health 
services and medicines to facilitate their recovery, they are unlikely to be able to exercise 
their rights and be a positive contributor to social change. Here, rehabilitation as a form of 
reparation is essential. 
 
Empowering victims also implies promoting their active inclusion in society. Transitional 
justice measures can also contribute to that end, by providing victims with information on the 
process and their rights and allow them to participate in the design and operation of those 
processes. Education is a key tool for this process, especially for children, youth, and those 
who missed out on schooling as children due to violence or repression; it is also a form of 
rehabilitation. It is not only a human right but also crucial to promoting victims’ recovery. It 
can help them to prepare for the future by developing their creative and critical thinking that 
facilitates their engagement in society and help them better realize their potential.105 
 
Legal empowerment of victims is also crucial to enhance the transformative potential of 
transitional justice. It implies providing victims with access to and knowledge of the law so 
that they can exercise and protect their rights.106 Waldorf shows how difficult it is to link 
transitional justice and legal empowerment given that both have developed in “separate 
policy silos.”107 Moreover, transitional justice mechanisms are often understaffed, lacking 
relevant skills, and underperforming.108 However, if an overall transitional justice strategy is 
designed to maximize its transformative potential, legal empowerment should be seen as a 
key tool for all transitional justice mechanisms. All of the mechanisms can be used to raise 
victims’ legal awareness and to let them experience the law as a tool to vindicate themselves 
as human beings. 
Fifth, guarantees of nonrepetition remain the missing piece of the transitional justice puzzle. 
These promises represent structural changes that contribute to transforming the ideologies 
that permitted the violence and influence people’s behavior. While they seem relevant in 
policy parlance and in the literature, very little has been done in countries undergoing 
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transitions to actually implement an overall strategy that addresses the root causes of conflict 
and repression or to effectively prevent the recurrence of violations. This is not to suggest 
that the same strategy should be implemented in all contexts because each situation requires a 
tailored approach that draws on different measures. But designing such a strategy requires 
first correctly identifying the root causes of conflict or repression and taking context into 
account.  
Transitional justice measures should help to strengthen the new foundations (legal and 
institutional) that are established after conflict or repression. However, in contrast to 
transitions from repressive regimes, in post-conflict situations an even greater potential exists 
to change the legal and institutional foundations, given that states are devastated after conflict 
and in need of reconstruction. Undoubtedly, there are fewer available resources (both 
financial and human) to achieve this, but such situations also offer a unique opportunity to 
start (almost) from scratch. Transitional justice mechanisms should seize this opportunity. 
Guarantees of nonrepetition need to work at various levels to address the root causes of 
conflict or repression.109 They should target various state sectors, such as the security and 
justice sectors, in accordance with the particular local context, but they should also go further 
when required and address, for example, the country’s socioeconomic structure. The 
measures required would include, but not be limited to, legal reform, prosecutions, vetting or 
lustration, and the establishment of new institutions or the reform of existing ones. Equally 
important, any reform of the establishment needs to go hand in-hand with a transformation of 
the dominant ideologies that allowed violence to flourish.  
Some could argue that guarantees of nonrepetition would enlarge the field of transitional in a 
way that blurs its normative boundaries. Yet this is far from the case. Indeed, an overall 
prevention strategy must be designed in a state emerging from conflict or repression, and 
transitional justice mechanisms can make important recommendations or carry out important 
work in this regard given the insights they have previously gained or the mandates they aim 
to fulfill. A different issue is who should take responsibility for delivering on the various 
guarantees of nonrepetition. Here, the state is obliged to carry out with due diligence the 
identification and implementation of guarantees of nonrepetition. Such guarantees take years, 
if not decades, to fully implement and effect significant social change. The responsibility for 
delivering them falls not only on state institutions engaged in the transition but also on other 
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state institutions, the international community, and nonstate actors, such as civil society or 
corporate actors. 
Conclusions [L1] 
While transformative justice might be seen in some circles as morally desirable, its advocates 
have yet to explain what is transformative about the notion or to provide a working agenda 
for transformative praxis that clearly addresses how, why, and when to establish a different 
and more radical form of intervention to deal with the past and the future of states ravaged by 
war or repression. The proponents of transformative justice need to provide more reliable 
evidence that such forms of intervention would work better and be more transformative than 
the ones currently in use. For example, the view that transitional justice should be a bottom-
up approach needs to be further discussed. We need more evidence that it would work in a 
way that would generate structural change in society. Surely, empowering victims is crucial 
and could constitute a structural change, but how to best deliver on this requires careful 
consideration.  
Criticisms of traditional transitional justice approaches often fail to see these methods as a 
field of political contestation where victims have agency—even if it is limited and 
asymmetric in comparison to other actors. Important examples exist in this regard, such as the 
Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who in their own terms have called for abuses 
“never [to happen] again” and have achieved some of their claims for justice. It is important 
to balance out criticisms of transitional justice with an understanding of the power of agency 
in these processes and their capacity to contribute to social change.110 
Yet, this chapter has aimed to reflect not only on the transformative justice discourse and the 
challenges that lie ahead, but, more importantly, offer a framework for understanding the 
relationship between social change and transitional justice, making explicit the types of 
changes that can be expected from the latter—namely, ordinary and structural changes. It has 
argued that transitional justice faces various limitations in its capacity to effect social change, 
which should be acknowledged, such as the context of recent conflict or repression, the 
nature of its mechanisms and processes, and the enormous challenge of transforming 
dominant ideologies and structures that allowed atrocities to take place.  
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The discussion about social change and transitional justice should be framed in terms of the 
transformative potential of transitional justice, rather than on alternative forms of justice. This 
seems a better approach, as it makes an explicit acknowledgment of the difficulties faced by 
transitional justice mechanisms when trying to achieve their objectives and contribute to 
achieving broader social change, while recognizing the opportunities that exist within the 
confines of transitional justice to bring about structural change.  
In this regard, some conditions have been identified as essential to inform any debate about 
the transformative potential of transitional justice, among them using transitional justice 
measures in a holistic manner, recognizing the need for long-term investment, empowering 
victims, and building synergies between parallel policy interventions such as humanitarian 
aid, peacebuilding measures, and development. More importantly, transitional states continue 
to underperform with respect to guarantees of nonrepetition, despite the huge opportunities 
for structural social change that a transitional justice approach provides. An argument has 
been put forward for them to take center stage in transitional justice processes, if prevention 
and social change are the objectives. Without guarantees of non-repetition, both will remain 
elusive. The advocates of transformative justice discourse need to consider how best to 
deliver on guarantees of nonrepetition to rebuild societies and provide victims with an 
entirely different experience of justice. 
